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SUMMARIES 
Carolyn Eisele's unique, ongoing career as a scholar 
is sketched, and the importance of her contributions to 
Peirce Studies and other fields is emphasized. The 
essay concludes with a series of suggestions about how 
to interpret Peirce's works based on themes related to 
the pioneering efforts of Dr. Eisele. 
Carolyn Eisele poursuit une carribre originale 
dont nous prdsentons un aperqu. Nous mettons en 
6vidence l'importance de sa contribution 2 notre 
connaissance de Peirce ainsi que son apport dans 
d'autres domaines. Notre essai se conclue par une 
sbrie de suggestions sur l'interpr&tation que l'on 
peut donner aux oeuvres de Peirce en se basant sur 
quelques th&nes issus des efforts de cette pionniere 
qu'est Carolyn Eisele. 
Es wird die einzigartige Karriere von Carolyn 
Eisele als Wissenschaftlerin skizziert und dabei die 
Bedeutung ihrer Beitr;ige zu Peirce-Studien wie auf 
anderen Gebieten betont. Der Essay schliei3t tit einer 
Reihe von Vorschllgen dazu, wie die Werke von Peirce 
in Verbindung mit den bahnbrechenden Bemiihungen von 
Frau Dr. Eisele zu interpretieren seien. 
The essays collected here honor two remarkable American 
scholarly careers, those of Charles Sanders (some add Santiago) 
Peirce and of a major interpreter of Peirce's works, Carolyn 
Eisele. We intersect with Eisele's career at a time when she 
has completed two major projects--her edition of Peirce's math- 
ematical works in The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles 
S. Peirce, and Richard Martin's collection of her numerous 
essays on Peirce. The former is vitally important because it 
shows that Peirce was a master mathematician and that his work 
in philosophy and logic is baptized in the spring that flows 
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from mathematics and science. The latter work, Eisele's own 
Studies, I personally regard as the best book about Peirce by 
a single author yet to appear, and essential reading for anyone 
who professes more than a superficial understanding of our 
country's great scientific philosopher. Moreover, she is pres- 
ently engaged upon at least two other contributions: an edition 
of Peirce's work as a historian of science, and a monograph on 
Peirce's mathematically based philosophy. All of this effort 
will be significant in making Peirce's thought more readily 
accessible to contemporary discussions wherein it can render 
considerable aid. We who know her note with pleasure and satis- 
faction that her projects are coming to fruition and that her 
important work continues. 
Here, on this occasion in New York City, it is appropriate 
to say something about Carolyn Eisele, her personal history and 
career in scholarship and education, and to be cheered by her 
successes thus far. She is a pure New Yorker, having been raised 
in Manhattan and educated at Hunter High School and Hunter Col- 
lege, with graduate work at Columbia University and later at 
the University of Chicago. Early in her academic career, she 
suffered, as did others, from the biases, some of which were 
institutionalized, against women, especially those who sought 
successful, independent, professional careers. It is interesting 
to note in this connection that Peirce was a pioneer in trying 
to reverse such trends in his own day. This was no doubt one 
of the first successful tests of her spirit, and perhaps part 
of the reason for its great strength. Having been recognized 
by some insightful and courageous academic leaders as a teacher 
of great promise, she soon became a regular member of the Hunter 
College Department of Mathematics, progressing from Instructor 
in 1923 through the rank of Full Professor in 1965. This is 
even more remarkable when one considers that although undisput- 
ably an able candidate who had completed virtually all the degree 
requirements, she was prevented from completing a doctoral degree 
by circumstances beyond her control. I am pleased to say that 
my own institution, Texas Tech University, conferred the doctor- 
ate upon Professor Eisele in 1980. Technically, this was an 
honorary degree, but we all know it was earned many times over. 
In presenting the degree, we were forced to waive the usual pre- 
degree formalities, for, to paraphrase the great Kittredge, 
Peirce's Harvard exposition teacher, "Who would we have found 
to examine her?" 
Beginning with her paper on the Liber Abaci [reprinted in 
Eisele 1979, 11-341, she launched a series of research projects 
in which she has conclusively shown that Peirce was a master 
mathematician and scientist and historian, and that his work 
in philosophy and logic is not separate from, nor separable from, 
but arises out of, mathematics and science. Most scholars of 
Peirce have assumed that his philosophy could be properly m&r- 
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stood independently of his work in mathematics and science, but 
Eisele has established that this assumption is not a fact but a 
hypothesis, and has defeated it, and thereby has reversed the 
flow of Peirce studies. In the course of demonstrating this 
basic thesis, which we now ought to call Eisele's Law, she has 
traveled literally to all the civilized ends of the earth (and 
to some uncivilized parts also) to pursue her research at the 
sources and to report her findings to colleagues in many disci- 
plines at international congresses and meetings. 
I first became closely acquainted with Carolyn Eisele in 
1975 when, due to a surprising conjunction of circumstances, 
she assumed responsibility for organizing the first international 
Peirce congress, held in Amsterdam in 1976 as a Bicentennial 
Event under the patronage of the United States Ambassador to 
The Netherlands, Kingdon Gould, Jr. I volunteered to help with 
this project, a step I have never regretted (although she worked 
me unmercifully), for I was thereby able to observe her scholarly 
and organizational abilities at first hand and to learn from her 
unwreckable spirit which torpedoed obstacles as quickly as they 
dared to sail within range. I am happy to report that the Pro- 
ceedings of this congress is now available from Texas Tech Uni- 
versity Press (1981, Proceedings of the C. S. Peirce Bicentennial 
International Congress), and represents, as did the Congress it 
reflects, another tribute to Carolyn Eisele's leadership and 
vision. 
I know that Dr. Eisele is still concerned that scholars of 
Peirce may bypass without notice her well-documented findings 
about the sources and fundamental nature of his philosophy. I 
for one am grateful to her for this basic and far-reaching lesson 
in logic. I hope she will permit me, as a further tribute to 
her as a teacher of teachers, to sketch how her work has inspired 
me to look into Peirce's mathematics in the way she recommends, 
to illuminate properly his philosophy--that is to say, so that 
it may be accurately understood. In conducting this interpre- 
tative exercise, I shall, as the saying goes, be standing on 
her shoulders. I shall give my results in the briefest form, 
saving elaboration for another time. 
For several years I have been aware that Peirce placed a 
high value on his Existential Graph system of logic. (The 
essential book for a more detailed discussion of Peirce's graph- 
ical logic is [Roberts 19731.) He developed this system in the 
1890s and used it profusely thereafter. I resolved to learn how 
to use it for basic logic, initially in order to understand 
Peirce, and perceived that it is a powerful logical calculus, 
one which gains in power because of its visual appeal and the 
fact that it has only five rules. Indeed, it is such a facile 
system that I have used it with considerable success as the 
basic calculus in my introductory logic courses for the past 
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few years. Having seen these results in the classroom, I re- 
solved to try to understand why this system of Existential 
Graphs functions so well, and to try to find out why Peirce 
valued it as a general philosophical tool. 
My first results along these lines were presented in 1980 to 
the Semiotic Society of America meeting in Lubbock, Texas. One 
reason Peirce thought highly of this system was that in his view, 
Existential Graphs provided a moving picture of semiosis (seem- 
eye-OH-sis), the process of sign action [Ketner 19801. This 
conclusion concerning Peirce's position follows from two well- 
documented statements: (1) All thought is in signs [Ketner 
1980, 261; and (2) Existential Graphs provide a moving picture 
of thought [Peirce ms 2981. From this one concludes that Exis- 
tential Graphs provide a moving picture of the sign process or 
semiosis; when this is coupled with other comments by Peirce, 
it follows that he seemed to have thought that Existential Graphs 
offered the best example of semiosis. The next question, then, 
is "What is it about the Existential Graph system that makes it 
the best example?" I suggest that it is not the graphic drawings 
themselves that are to be understood as examples, but that the 
whole process of using this graphic system, in its fullest con- 
text, is the example. This process, it seems to me, is simply 
the entire apparatus of objective or scientific or philosophic 
method, as Peirce conceived it. I shall advance only a few 
select considerations in support of this guess. 
If one looks for other statements about Existential Graphs, 
particularly ones that show how they fit into the overall 
Peircean philosophic system, it becomes clear that he applauded 
them because they were a fine instance of what he called "dia- 
grammatic thought." They are only one kind of diagrammatic 
thought, but a particularly fruitful and powerful instance of 
such thought for the purposes of philosophical understanding. 
In Peirce's account, the total category of diagrammatic thought 
was simply mathematics in general--mathematical thought is the 
thought that works by diagrams, more precisely through construc- 
tion of diagrams and experimentation upon them, to reach objec- 
tively confirmed conclusions. To quote Peirce, the method of 
treating a problem mathematically is "constructing some sort 
of diagram representing that which is supposed to be open to the 
observation of every scientific intelligence, and thereupon 
mathematically--that is intuitionally, deducing the consequences 
of that hypothesis" [quoted in Eisele 1979, 2771. 
"Intuitionally!" the philosopher in me screams! This cannot 
be, because if Peirce had done no other thing in philosophy, he 
would be famous only for his refutation of epistemic intuitionism 
in his great series of three anti-Cartesian essays which began 
with "Questions concerning certain faculties claimed for man" 
[see Ketner 1977, 261. "Don't collapse on reaching the first 
problem," I can hear the spirit Carolyn Eisele exemplifies say- 
ing, so I look a little further and find, in his review (1895) 
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of Klein's book on Riemann [Ketner & Cook 1978, 1061, Peirce 
assuring us that "attentive intuition" in mathematics is not 
intuition in the anti-Cartesian sense of the "Questions" article. 
It is probably another way of focusing our attention upon a 
crucial aspect of diagrammatic reasoning. Thus, when a diagram 
is made available to the mathematical method, we begin to ex- 
periment on the diagram, creating small and very evident changes, 
either simple additions or simple omissions. These steps are 
so small and evident that any objective intelligence will come 
to agree that each is a correct step: that which is small and 
evident by way of transformation is what is "intuitive" mathe- 
maticalLy for Peirce. 
To summarize, Peirce regarded mathematical thought as an 
observational, experimental, and fallible objective (scientific) 
method. Moreover, it provides us with a very cheap experiment-- 
the only cost is that of constructing the diagram and time 
spent observing it in search of as yet unnoticed relationships. 
Still another benefit of mathematical method, Peirce thought, 
is that it gives one the greatest possible generality, since the 
last step in the method is to generalize the results attained 
in earlier procedures [Eisele 1976, 3:7491. This last point 
suggests that even semiotic, the general theory of signs, might 
be the result of the application of mathematical method to a 
particular problem area, else semiotic would not possess the 
extreme generality it has. 
Peirce's account of the nature of mathematical thought 
bears interesting resemblances to the current school of Brouwer, 
the so-called Mathematical Intuitionists (see selections in 
[Benacerraf and Putnam 19641. Some preliminary study shows that 
Brouwer was associated with Mannoury and the Signific Group in 
The Netherlands. The Signific Group is very significant, for 
its members were disciples of Victoria Lady Welby, the founder 
of signifies, who was solidly influenced by Peirce. Peirce had 
even sent her some accounts of his Existential Graphs (see the 
Peirce/Welby correspondence in [Hardwick 19771). I am pursuing 
this matter further, and I see good reason to believe that 
Peirce's account of diagrammatic thought might deal more effec- 
tively with some issues addressed by mathematical intuitionism. 
But that is a future task. 
With the forgoing in mind, perhaps we can now appreciate 
why Peirce wrote to his friend, Judge Russell, that it was his 
business "to apply the ideas of mathematics in philosophy" 
[Eisele 1979, 2771. This also lends support to claims that 
Peirce had a philosophy amounting to a unified theory of objec- 
tive methodology, or at least a philosophy that equals a theory, 
itself advanced as an objective hypothesis, concerning where 
objective (nonarbitrary) method is to be found, how such method 
functions, and what such method presupposes. Peirce's answer 
in part is that it is encountered almost everywhere in human 
affairs, but that its purest form is found in mathematical 
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method. Further confirmation of this interpretation was pre- 
sented in Professor Eisele's paper on the Liber Abaci, wherein 
she noted an important statement by Peirce: "From the moment 
when I could think at all, until now, about forty years, I have 
been diligently and incessantly occupied with the study of 
methods of inquiry, both those which have been and are pursued 
and those which ought to be pursued" [Eisele 1979, 11-341. 
In conclusion, let me offer one additional suggestion which 
arose from a comment Professor Eisele once made to me. She re- 
marked that Peirce's pragmaticistic maxim was little more than 
an abstract characterization of the general form of any scien- 
tific experiment. If so, this would mean that the pragmatic- 
istic maxim is the result of mathematical generalization from 
concrete experience, a kind of procedure basic to the objective 
method of resolving doubts, a method that sharply contrasts 
with the nonobjective or arbitrary methods of doubt resolution 
Peirce sketched in his famous "Fixation of Belief" article [see 
Ketner 1977, 1071. From this it would follow that pragmaticism 
as a maxim is a necessity for any instance of objective method, 
if experimentation is essential for objectivity. But in his 
later years Peirce used the term Pragmaticism as a name for his 
entire philosophy and announced that he had achieved a proof of 
pragmaticism. Attempts to reconstruct such a proof have as yet 
been less than satisfactory. Perhaps we have been looking with 
the wrong preconceptions in mind. If we donned the mathematical 
and methodological spectacles which Carolyn Eisele recommends, 
perhaps something like the following is plausible. It may well 
be that Peirce was dogged most of his life by the difficulty he 
noted at the end of the Fixation article, namely, the fact that 
there is no reason engraved somewhere within the cosmos to which 
a person in need of a method can appeal in selecting the objec- 
tive method from among the total list of methods he mentions. 
Concisely, this difficulty is "Why be objective (Why use the 
objective method)?" In the same article, Peirce hints that the 
answer to this question is not to think in terms of seeking 
reasons (a Lamarkian strategy), but to think of consequences 
(a Darwinian strategy). That is, the value of any method lies 
in its consequences. So, if one wants to give a proof of the 
objective method, it must be accomplished through the function- 
ing of the pragmaticistic maxim (through experiment, in other 
words). Hence the proof of "capital P Pragmaticism" is not a 
demonstration of pragmaticism the maxim, but an apology or de- 
fense of the preferability of objective method in general using 
pragmaticism the maxim. This, if true, would mean that the 
defensibility of Pragmaticism, the name of Peirce's entire phil- 
osophy or unified theory of the nature of objective method, is 
the object of the proof of pragmaticism. This interpretation 
might also help to clarify Peirce's reasons for referring con- 
stantly to Existential Graphs and diagrammatic thought when he 
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discusses the proof of pragmaticism. Because the Existential 
Graph system is an instance of diagrammatic thought, it is 
therefore a cheap experiment, and a natural "pocket laboratory" 
or example for use in discussions of the processes of objective 
method. This would also mean that the proof of Pragmaticism 
is in some sense a mathematical proof. In carrying out the im- 
plications of such suggestions, one will clearly have to rely 
upon many of the results of Carolyn Eisele's distinguished 
career, her permanent accomplishments and ongoing research. 
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